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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1955
unsuccessfully sought there was a specific performance of the earnest money agree-
ment rather than damages, and a contract may be too indefinite to allow the former
but still sufficiently definite to permit awarding the latter remedy.
It was the position of a dissent that the earnest money agreement should be
construed as a contract to make a second contract, the terms of which had not been
agreed upon, and so was unenforceable.
A number of questions occur to the reader of the opinions in the Hedges and Hubbell
cases. When, if ever, is an earnest money agreement specifically enforceable? When
will it be so indefinite that it will not support an action for damages? What is the
effect of the intent of the parties to execute a subsequent, more detailed contract for
the sale of the land?
Guaranty Contract-Consideration. The case of Universal C.LT. Credit Corpora-
tlion v. DeLisle, 147 Wash. Dec. 283, 287 P.2d 302 (1955), was an action upon a written
guaranty. Dealer was in the business of selling motor cars and executed a contract
with C.I.T. whereby C.I.T. agreed to finance Dealer's car and purchases and Dealer
promised to assign to C.I.T. its commercial paper. Subsequent to the execution of this
financing contract, DeLisle, who was owner of 37% of the stock of Dealer, executed a
guaranty to C.I.T. which basically was as follows: "Each of us request you to extend
credit to, make advances ... and to induce you to do so and in consideration thereof ..
each of us... unconditionally guarantees to you ... all Dealer's present and future
obligations to you.." C.I.T. continued to finance the car purchases and subsequently
lost money as a result of Dealer's becoming financially involved. An action brought
by C.I.T. on the guaranty was dismissed by.the trial court. The judgment was affirmed
on appeal, the court holding that the guarantee was not supported by an independent
consideration and consequently was unenforceable. The court failed to recognize that
the guaranty could be construed as an offer for a unilateral contract and that the subse-
quent extension of credit by C.I.T. was the acceptance of this offer. Such an analysis
would of course have resulted in a contrary holding by the appellate court. For further
comment on this and similar cases the reader is referred to a comment entitled Consid-
eration in Suretyship Contracts in lWashington, 31 WAsH. L. REv. 76, where the
problem is dealt with at length.
CORPORATIONS
Appraisal Statutes-Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders. In
Van Buren v. Highway Ranch Inc.,' the only activity of the defendant
corporation was the leasing of a large wheat ranch in eastern Wash-
ington. Since incorporation in 1930, this lease had been held by
plaintiff, a minority shareholder. In 1953, the corporation decided not
to renew, leasing instead to the son of the majority shareholder. This
was done in accordance with RCW 23.36.140, which provides that a
sale, lease, or exchange of all the assets of a corporation may be
authorized by a vote of two-thirds of the shareholders' voting power,
or such percentage as may be provided for in the articles of incorpora-
tion. Dissenting from this move, and alleging unfairness and a breach of
146 Wn.2d 582, 283 P.2d 132 (1955).
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fiduciary relationship, plaintiff thereupon brought his action pursuant
to RCW 26.16.140 and RCW 26.16.160. The former provides that
a shareholder who did not vote in favor of corporate action authorized
by RCW 23.36.140 and who, within twenty days, files with the corpor-
ation his written objection thereto, shall be paid the value of his shares.
The latter provides that, in case of dispute over the value of such
shares, the matter may be submitted to judicial determination.
Reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme court ruled that
the appraisal statutes did not apply when the lease, sale, or merger of
all corporate assets could be said to be within the corporation's "normal
and regular course of business." Here, of course, the sole business of
defendant corporation was the leasing of its wheat ranch. This exception
is generally recognized and applied by the courts,' even in the absence
of express statutory provision. As for plaintiff's allegation of breach
of fiduciary duty, the court held that normal and regular course of
business "refers not to the equity or fairness of a particular transaction,
but to whether it was a class of which ... the corporation is expressly
authorized to consummate."'
More significantly, plaintiff also contended that statutory relief
should be granted him in this case, otherwise the decision in Matteson
v. Ziebarth4 would preclude him from any other remedy. There, the
minority shareholder sought to enjoin a merger as unfair. He did not
seek appraisal, and had not filed his objection to the corporate action
within the statutory time limit. The court held that in the absence of
actual fraud, his only possible remedy lay in the appraisal statutes and
that he could not enjoin the merger on the ground of unfairness.
In rejecting this argument, the court distinguished the two cases on
the facts. It was pointed out that in the Matteson case, plaintiff, by
failing to comply with statutory requirements, had himself rejected
what otherwise might have been a valid case for appraisal, and had
instead chosen an injunctive remedy. Here, since the transaction was
within the regular course of business, statutory relief had been unavail-
able from the start. Concluding by way of dictum, the court then
stated that "Matteson is not authority for the proposition that the
statutes under consideration would prevent respondents from seeking
relief in equity. Nothing said in this opinion is intended to imply that
2 jeppi v. Brockman Holding Co., 34 Cal.2d 11, 206 P.2d 847 (1949).
3 46 Wn.2d at 586, 283 P.2d at 135.
140 Wn.2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
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respondents are, or are not, entitled to equitable relief."' The rationale
of this is simply that in a case where statutory appraisal is at no time
an available remedy, obviously it cannot exclude any other.
As might be expected, most cases involving appraisal statutes have
arisen upon proposed mergers or sales of all corporate assets, rather
than leases, but in Washington the principles involved are identical.'
Prior to the enactment of such statutes, the common law rule was that
the dissenting vote of a single shareholder was enough to defeat any
attempted sale or merger of a prosperous corporation.7 With the growth
of modern industrial combines, however, it became increasingly appar-
ent that this placed an inordinate degree of power in the hands of a
few. A clear minority could thus effectively block action potentially
beneficial to the vast majority. As a result, statutes were passed in
most states providing for such moves upon the vote of a reasonable
majority of shareholders.? Complementary legislation has usually made
it possible for dissenters, if they so desired, to obtain an appraisal and
payment for the value of their shares.'
Not content to depend solely upon the efficacy of appraisal statutes,
however, most courts continued to entertain equitable actions in the
event of fraud or unfairness." To avoid this, some states passed
statutes expressly making appraisal and payment the exclusive remedy
of minority shareholders. 1 In Washington, RCW 26.16.150 provides
that any shareholder who did not vote in favor of such corporate
action and who did not within the time allowed him file with the
corporation his written objection thereto, demanding payment for his
shares, "shall be bound by such corporate action with like force and
effect as though such shareholder had voted in favor of such corporate
action." On its face, this statute does not expressly say that appraisal
is the sole remedy. In Matteson v. Ziebarth,"2 however, the court
construed its language as follows: "We are of the view that, under
our own act, the statutory remedy is likewise exclusive as to unfairness
46 Wn.2d at 586-587, 283 P.2d at 135.6 RCW 23.36.140 and RCW 23.16.140 refers to "sales, leases, or exchanges," and also
"'mergers and consolidations."
7 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 5797 (1943).
* Id. at § 5798.
Id. at § 5891.
1', Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1004 (1904).
1 Cal. Civil Code § 369 (17) and Mich. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 44, 45 are examples. For
a lively and able "battle of the experts" on the policy arguments concerning remedial
exclusiveness of appraisal statutes, see Ballantine and Sterling, Upsetting Mergers and
Consolidations, 27 CALIF. L.REv. 644 (1939) [arguing for statutory exclusiveness] ; and -
Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes, 38 MIcH. L.REv. 1165 (1940) [arguing
against].
' Note 4, supra.
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or breach of fiduciary duty short of [1] actual fraud,"'1 or [21
breach of fiduciary duty or unfairness unknown to the aggrieved
shareholder at the time of the shareholders' meeting at which the
corporate action was approved.
Since the latter exception can be avoided easily by simply telling
the minority shareholder about the impending move, the question of
what precisely was meant by actual fraud thus assumed critical im-
portance for the Washington corporate attorney. The matter is not
settled since in the course of the Matteson opinion, the words "fraud"
and "actual fraud" were used interchangeably without any definition
of them being given.
Actual fraud, or fraud in fact, is usually defined as that type which
includes, among others, the classic elements of intent to deceive and
deception. " Under this meaning, it is clear that the court's first excep-
tion could also be circumvented easily by informing the minority of
the planned transaction, since no deception could then be said to exist.
Constructive fraud, or fraud in law, is broadly defined as a breach
of legal, equitable, or fiduciary duty, which, irrespective of guilt or
intent, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency (1) to
deceive others or (2) to violate public or private confidence, or to
injure public interests."
The last paragraph of RCW 23.36.140, which provides for the
original transfer of all corporate assets upon a two-thirds shareholders
vote, must now be noted. This paragraph, which was not referred to
directly in the Matteson decision, provides that "This section shall
not be construed to authorize conveyance or exchange of assets which
would otherwise be in fraud of corporate creditors or minority share-
holders or shareholders without voting rights." If the court restricts
the meaning of "fraud" as used in this paragraph to cases involving
deception, again it is obvious that the paragraph's import can be
avoided easily in the same manner as stated above. If this be the case,
the Washington appraisal statutes, as a practical matter, must be
regarded as providing the exclusive relief for the dissenting minority,
without exception. In addition no legal, equitable, or fiduciary relation-
ship could then be said to exist between the majority and minority
'3 40 Wn.2d at 297, 298, 242 P.2d at 1028.
14Barker v. Scandinavian-American Bank. 97 Wash. 272, 166 Pac. 618 (1917).
15 Bell v. Bell, 44 Ariz. 520, 39 P.2d 629 (1935). An example of (1), above, can be
found in Thompson v. Huston, 17 Wn2d 457, 135 P2d 834 (1943). There the court
held that untrue and misleading statements amounted to "constructive fraud," though
made in entire good faith.
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shareholders in the area of statutory reorganizations involving all the
corporate assets, providing the former first notify the latter about the
planned transaction.
Should the court be willing to interpret the term "fraud" as includ-
ing "constructive fraud," another result might well accrue. An attempt
by an unscrupulous majority to force a highly unfavorable transaction
upon the minority might be regarded as "constructive fraud" and
subject to nullification."
Under a possible aspect of this theory, fair dealing would simply
be a condition precedent to a valid exercise of the two-third majority's
rights under RCW 23.36.140 and once complied with, statutory
appraisal would then be the exclusive remedy of the minority share-
holder as per RCW 23.16.150.
The court is not foreclosed from making either of the two above
interpretations by the Matteson decision. First of all, as was stated,
no definition of fraud was given. Secondly, the court held that there
was no fraud in the Matteson case, not because of the lack of any
technical elements of that term, such as deception, but because of a
finding that the transaction in question was in fact advantageous to
the minority shareholder. 7 What the court said in effect was: there
is no fraud here because there is no unfairness.
As a result, the question of exactly what the court meant by "fraud"
must be considered as unresolved. As a necessary corollary to this,
the extent of exclusiveness of Washington's appraisal statutes must be
regarded as unclear at the present time.
Some indication of a possible future result may be gleaned from the
Matteson decision itself, however. In distinguishing it from Theis v.
Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 8 the court employed the following
language at page 301:
In that case, it was held that an attempted dissolution of a prosperous
corporation and the transfer of its assets to a new corporation, not
for any bona fide business reason, but for the sole purpose of getting
rid of a disagreeable stockholder who refused to sell his stock, was
fraudulent and would be set aside.
1.3 Whicher v. Delaware Mines Corporation, 52 Idaho 304, 15 P.2d 610 (1932). This
case involved a non-statutory reorganization. The minority shareholder involved
had prior knowledge of the proposed transaction, and had protested against it. Though
there was clearly no deception, the court ruled that the attempt of the majority to force
a financially disadvantageous scheme on the minority against their will was "construc-
tively fraudulent." This case was quoted at great length and with approval in Moore v.
Los Lugos Gold Mines, 172 Wash. 570, 21 P.2d 253 (1933).
17 Supra note 4, at page 300.
18 Supra note 10.
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It must be noted that the Matteson court did not overrule Theis,
but, in distinguishing it, or "limiting its scope," implied that its rule
would still apply to a similar fact situation.
The essential fact difference between the two cases is that in
Matteson the minority shareholder was denied relief since the corpora-
tion involved was held to be in precarious financial condition and the
proposed transaction was ruled to be actually fair and advantageous
to him, whereas in Theis relief was given because the involved corpora-
tion was a going concern and the proposed transfer, which would have
eliminated, or "frozen-out" the plaintiff, was thereby deemed "fraudu-
lent."
The latter assumes special significance in light of the fact that in
the Theis case, the minority shareholder was fully aware of the pro-
posed scheme at the time of the shareholder's meeting. Though the
classic element of deception necessary for "fraud in fact" was absent,
the conduct involved was still considered fraudulent.
If the Theis rationale is followed in the future, it is likely that a
"freeze-out" of a minority shareholder of a prosperous or expanding
corporation by the device of merger or consolidation and attendant
stock manipulation would not be tolerated in Washington. Such a
course, at any rate, is clearly not negatived by the Matteson decision.
Returning to the Van Buren case, the dictum referred to there has
no effect on the Matteson case as such, because of the explicitly distin-
guished fact situations. It does, however, stake out an area wherein,
if the corporate transaction can be said to be within its "normal and
regular course of business," the appraisal statutes have no application.
Since the minority shareholder then can get no possible remedy at law,
the court implies that, if treated unfairly, he may obtain equitable
relief.
ARTHuR T. LANE
Corporations-Taxability of Distribution of Real Property Upon Dissolution.
Deer Park Pine Industry Inc. v. Stevens County, 46 Wn.2d 852, 286 P.2d 98 (1955).
Upon the dissolution of a certain North Columbia Company, a Washington corporation,
a distribution h kind of the company's real property assets was made to the former
shareholders. The approximate value of this property, most of which was located in
Stevens County, was in excess of five hundred thousand dollars. At the same time, the
former shareholders also assumed their proportionate shares of the liabilities of the
dissolved corporation. These amounted to approximately one hundred thousand dollars.
The question in this case was whether the distribution of real property to the former
shareholders was subject to the one per cent county tax on real estate sales, as authorized
by RCW 28.45. The court held that it normally was not, there being no conveyance for
[SUM.IER
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a valuable consideration. But where, as here, the former shareholders also assume
the liabilities of the dissolved corporation, it was ruled that the real estate sales tax
is applicable to the extent of the liabilities assumed by the shareholders. Thus, the
former shareholders here paid the one per cent sales tax to the extent of the approxi-
mately one hundred thousand dollars worth of liabilities assumed by them.
COM1MUNITY PROPERTY
Tort Liability and Conflicts of Laws. In Maag v. Voykovichk ' a hus-
band committed an assault in Alaska. At the time of the tort, the
husband was a Washington domiciliary. The suit was brought in
Washington, and the court assumed that the liability would have been
a community obligation had the tort been committed in Washington.
The court held, however, that since the tort was committed in Alaska,
the obligation was only against the individual husband, and not against
the marital community. While the reasoning of this decision is
supported by many Washington cases,2 the author submits that it is
incorrect, since it is based upon a semantic misinterpretation which
dates back to 1896.
The court's reasoning proceeds as follows: since the tort was com-
mitted in Alaska, we will adhere to the usual conflict of laws rule and
apply the law of Alaska.' In Alaska there is no marital community so
therefore we must employ the common law rule which would hold
only the husband's property liable for the tort. Because only the
property of the husband could be levied on to satisfy a judgment in
Alaska, we hold that only the husband's separate property in Wash-
ington can be so utilized, and therefore it is not a marital community
obligation.
The author believes that the semantic confusion comes in the use
of the word "separate." "Separate property" as used in Washington
doesn't mean the same as "husband's property" as used in Alaska. This
distinction is correctly pointed out by Judge Hill in his "concurring ' 4
opinion which relies strongly on the criticism of Marsh in his treatise
on marital property.'
146 W2d 302, 280 P.2d 680 (1955).
2 The only tort case is Mountain v. Price, 20 Wn.2d 129, 146 P.2d 327 (1944), but in
the contract area see Achilles v. Hoopes, 40 Wn.2d 664, 245 P.2d 1005 (1952) ; Meng v.
Security State Bank, 16 Wn.2d 215, 133 P.2d 293 (1943) ; La Selle v. Woolery, 14
Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115 (1896), and other cases cited in the majority opinion of the Maag
case.
3 RLESTATEMfENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
4 Judge Hill concurs in the result on the basis of stare decisis only. His opinion is
a dissent against the reasoning employed by the court and the result reached in these
cases.
5MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 146 (1952).
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